## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BEFORE HONORABLE DANA M. SABRAW, JUDGE PRESIDING

ANA WHITLOW, ET AL.,

PLAINTIFFS,

VS.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ET AL.,

DEFENDANTS.

DEFENDANTS.

CASE NO. 16CV1715-DMS

) SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA
) FRIDAY, AUGUST 12, 2016
) 1:30 P.M. CALENDAR
)

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

MOTION HEARING

REPORTED BY:

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UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE
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## SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA - FRIDAY, AUGUST 12, 2016 - 1:30 P.M. 1 2 3 THE CLERK: NO. 8 ON CALENDAR, CASE NO. 16CV1715, WHITLOW VERSUS THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION; ON FOR MOTION 4 5 HEARING. THE COURT: GOOD AFTERNOON. MAY I HAVE APPEARANCES, 6 7 PLEASE? 8 MR. TURNER: MY NAME IS JAMES TURNER, ATTORNEY FOR 9 THE PLAINTIFFS. 10 WE HAVE AT THE TABLE KIM MACK ROSENBERG, ROBERT 11 MOXLEY. AND TWO ATTORNEYS BEHIND OUR TABLE HERE ARE BETSY 12 LEHRFELD AND CARL LEWIS. 13 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU. GOOD AFTERNOON AND WELCOME. 14 15 AND FOR THE DEFENSE? 16 MR. RICH: GOOD MORNING, YOUR HONOR. DEPUTY 17 ATTORNEY GENERAL JONATHAN RICH. 18 AND WITH ME IS DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL JACQUELYN 19 YOUNG, REPRESENTING DEFENDANTS THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, STATE OF CALIFORNIA BOARD OF 20 21 EDUCATION, TOM TORLAKSON AS SUPERINTENDENT OF THE DEPARTMENT 22 OF EDUCATION, STATE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH, AND KAREN 23 SMITH AS THE DIRECTOR OF THAT DEPARTMENT. THE COURT: THANK YOU. 24 25 MS. BARRY: GOOD AFTERNOON, YOUR HONOR. MARY PAT

BARRY PRESENT ON BEHALF OF COUNTY OF SANTA BARBARA DEFENDANTS DR. WADA AND DR. DEAN. 3 THE COURT: THANK YOU. AND WELCOME. I HAVE READ ALL OF THE BRIEFING, ALL OF THE 4 5 SUBMISSIONS, AND ALL OF THE EVIDENCE, INCLUDING THE AFFIDAVITS 6 THAT WERE SUBMITTED. AND I APPRECIATE THE BRIEFING VERY MUCH. 7 FOR TODAY'S HEARING, AS I UNDERSTAND THE FOCUS -- I 8 WOULD INQUIRE FIRST OF MR. TURNER. 9 THERE IS NOT A REQUEST FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST ANY OF THE COUNTY DEFENDANTS. AM I CORRECT? 10 11 MR. TURNER: THAT IS CORRECT. 12 THE COURT: THE FOCUS IS TO PRELIMINARILY ENJOIN THE STATE FROM REPEALING THE PERSONAL BELIEF EXEMPTION, THE PBE. 13 14 MR. TURNER: THAT IS CORRECT. THE COURT: THAT WOULD BE THE SINGULAR FOCUS. 15 16 MR. TURNER: THAT IS THE SINGULAR ISSUE BEFORE THE 17 COURT AT THIS POINT. 18 THE COURT: THERE ARE AT LEAST A COUPLE OF 19 AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES WITH RESPECT TO, FOR EXAMPLE, THE IEP IN 20 MADERA AND PLACER COUNTIES RAISED BY SAUNDERS AND SALGADO, I 21 BELIEVE -- DELGADO AND SAUNDERS FAMILY, AND THE ADAMS FAMILY 22 IN ORANGE COUNTY HAS RAISED THAT ISSUE. 23 THOSE AS-APPLIED ISSUES ARE AGAINST COUNTIES WHO ARE 24 NOT NAMED DEFENDANTS. YOU ARE NOT PURSUING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

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AT THIS TIME, ARE YOU?

MR. TURNER: WE ARE PURSUING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF ON THE STATUTE ITSELF, WHICH WOULD COVER ALL COUNTIES AS FAR AS THE ISSUES ON THE PERSONAL BELIEF EXEMPTIONS AND THE EFFORTS OF SB 277 TO LIMIT THE EXEMPTIONS.

THE COURT: BUT WITH RESPECT TO THE SPECIFIC ISSUE

THE COURT: BUT WITH RESPECT TO THE SPECIFIC ISSUE OF, FOR EXAMPLE, IN MADERA AND PLACER COUNTIES, COUNTIES THAT MAY NOT BE PERMITTING CHILDREN WITH IEP'S TO ATTEND, ARGUABLY IN VIOLATION OF LAW, THAT ISSUE IS NOT ON THE TABLE AT THE PRESENT TIME. THAT WOULD BE AN AS-APPLIED CHALLENGE, AS I VIEW IT.

MR. TURNER: THAT IS CORRECT. HOWEVER, WE ARE
CITING THAT AND UTILIZING THAT TO SHOW UNEVEN APPLICATION OF
THE STATUTE WITH REGARD TO THE VARIOUS EXEMPTIONS.

THE COURT: SO THAT WOULD BE AN EVIDENTIARY ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF, FOR EXAMPLE, AN EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIM.

MR. TURNER: THAT IS CORRECT.

THE COURT: SIMILARLY, THERE ARE AS-APPLIED

CHALLENGES RELATING TO SANTA BARBARA COUNTY AND EFFORTS THAT

PLAINTIFFS CLAIM ARE BEING MADE AGAINST THE COUNTY ESSENTIALLY

TO DISSUADE DOCTORS FROM PROVIDING MEDICAL EXEMPTIONS. THAT

ISSUE IS NOT ON THE TABLE.

MR. TURNER: THAT ISSUE IS NOT ON THE TABLE TODAY.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. AND THANK YOU FOR THAT

CLARIFICATION.

THIS LAW WAS ENACTED JUNE 30, 2015, IT WAS EFFECTIVE

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JANUARY 1, 2016. AND I HAVE A COUPLE OF QUESTIONS HERE.
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              FIRST, WITH RESPECT TO THE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF THAT IS
 3
    REQUESTED, WHEN DOES SCHOOL START FOR THE 17 INDIVIDUAL
    PLAINTIFFS? I SUSPECT THERE ARE DIFFERENT START DATES, BUT DO
 4
 5
    YOU HAVE THE EARLIEST?
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              MR. TURNER: THERE ARE DIFFERENT START DATES. WE
    HAVE START DATES APPROXIMATELY THE 15TH OF AUGUST, ALTHOUGH I
 7
     BELIEVE THAT ONE START DATE MIGHT HAVE ALREADY OCCURRED.
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 9
               THE COURT: THEN THE SOONEST THAT YOU ARE AWARE OF
    WOULD BE AUGUST 15?
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11
              MR. TURNER: THAT IS CORRECT.
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               THE COURT: WHO WOULD THAT RELATE TO?
              MR. TURNER: WE WILL CHECK THAT, YOUR HONOR.
13
14
               THE COURT: ALL RIGHT.
               CAN YOU APPROXIMATE FOR ME, ARE MOST PLAINTIFFS
15
16
     STARTING AFTER LABOR DAY, OR SOMETIME LATER IN AUGUST PRIOR TO
17
    LABOR DAY?
              MR. TURNER: MOST AFTER LABOR DAY -- PARDON ME.
18
    AM SORRY. MOST BEFORE LABOR DAY.
19
20
               THE COURT: DO YOU HAVE A START DATE FOR MOST OF THE
21
    PLAINTIFFS?
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              MR. TURNER: NOW AND SEPTEMBER 1ST.
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               THE COURT: BETWEEN NOW AND SEPTEMBER 1.
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              MR. TURNER: NOW AND SEPTEMBER 1ST FOR MOST
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    PLAINTIFFS.
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THE COURT: ALL RIGHT.

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THE FOLLOW-UP QUESTION IS, WHY WAIT TO FILE THE LAWSUIT AT THIS TIME WHEN IT BECAME EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1 OF THIS YEAR?

MR. TURNER: THERE WERE A NUMBER OF PLAINTIFFS THAT
WERE IN NEGOTIATIONS -- FIRST OF ALL, ALL OF THE PLAINTIFFS
ARE PARTIALLY VACCINATED PATIENTS -- PLAINTIFFS. AND THEY
WERE -- A NUMBER OF THEM WERE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE STATE -WITH THEIR OWN SCHOOL -- EXCUSE ME -- AND THEY WERE GOING BACK
AND FORTH AS TO WHETHER THEY WOULD OR WOULD NOT BE ADMITTED.
NOW, IN ONE INSTANCE THEY WERE INFORMED ON JUNE 29TH THAT THEY
WOULD NOT BE ADMITTED INTO THE SCHOOL.

IN ADDITION, THERE IS THAT ISSUE, AND BETWEEN

JANUARY 1ST AND JULY 1ST WE HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF

COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE HEALTH DEPARTMENT AND THE EDUCATION

DEPARTMENT ABOUT WHAT -- HOW THEY WERE GOING TO IMPLEMENT THIS

LAW, WHAT WERE THE SPECIFICS GOING TO BE. SO THAT THERE WAS

AN OPENING ON AN-ONGOING BASIS AS TO THE IDEA THAT IT WOULD BE

CLARIFIED AND REGULATIONS OR SOMETHING WOULD COME FORWARD THAT

WOULD INDICATE THAT THIS IS THE WAY YOU PROCEED UNDER THE NEW

LAW.

NO SUCH GUIDANCE EVER DID COME FORWARD, SO THAT IT
WAS NOT UNTIL THE LAW ACTUALLY WENT INTO ITS FINAL DAY OF -ACTUALLY ITS FINAL ENACTING DAY, THE DAY THAT IT BECAME
EFFECTIVE WAS JULY 1ST. THAT'S THE DAY THAT WE FILED BECAUSE

AT THAT POINT THERE WAS NO LONGER ANY LIKELIHOOD OF REGULATION

OR OF AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SCHOOL AND THE PERSON THAT THEY

WERE DEALING WITH AT THE SCHOOL. SO THAT IS WHY WE FILED THEM

THAT DATE.

THE COURT: SO, AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, THE
PLAINTIFFS, THROUGH YOUR OFFICES, ATTEMPTED TO RESOLVE THE
ISSUE THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. AND ONCE IT WAS CLEAR THAT THAT
WAS UNFRUITFUL THEN THE LAWSUIT WAS FILED.

MR. TURNER: THAT IS CORRECT. THAT IT WAS THROUGH
THE AUSPICES OF THE VARIOUS ATTORNEYS INVOLVED WITH THE SUIT
AND OTHERS, NOT JUST MYSELF.

THE COURT: YOU WOULD AGREE, THOUGH, WOULDN'T YOU,
THAT THE EFFECTIVE DATE BEING WHAT IT IS, JANUARY 1, 2016,
SCHOOL BEING MANDATORY, THAT THIS ISSUE WOULD BE RIPE,
PERHAPS, FOR REVIEW AND COULD HAVE BEEN PRESENTED IMMEDIATELY
AFTER JANUARY 1?

MR. TURNER: WELL, THE ACTUAL FINAL EFFECTIVE DATE
OF THE LEGISLATION IS JULY 1ST. THAT'S WHEN IT FINALLY WENT
INTO EFFECT. AND THAT WAS THE DATE THAT WE THOUGHT IF WE
COULD GET RESOLUTION OF THESE ISSUES PRIOR TO THAT IT WOULD BE
RESOLVED. AND THEN IT TURNED OUT THAT IT WASN'T, THERE WERE
NO REGULATIONS, THERE WAS NO FRAMEWORK SET FORWARD FOR HOW
SOMEONE COULD APPROACH THE SCHOOLS AND LEARN WHAT THEY WERE
SUPPOSED TO DO.

THE COURT: THE EFFECTIVE DATE WAS JULY 1? I

THOUGHT IT WAS JANUARY 1 PER STATUTE. AM I INCORRECT? 2 MR. RICH: YOUR HONOR, YOU ARE CORRECT. THE FIRST 3 EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE STATUTE WAS JANUARY 1. IT WAS AS OF THAT DATE THAT PERSONAL BELIEF EXEMPTIONS WOULD NO LONGER BE 4 5 ACCEPTED. 6 THE JULY 1ST DATE THAT COUNSEL IS REFERRING TO IS 7 THE DATE AT WHICH LOCAL SCHOOL BOARDS WERE EXPRESSLY BARRED FROM ACCEPTING ANY STUDENTS WITHOUT A PERSONAL BELIEF 8 EXEMPTION THAT HAD NOT BEEN SUBMITTED PRIOR TO JANUARY 1, 9 10 2016. 11 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. OKAY. I THINK I HAVE 12 SUFFICIENT INFORMATION ON THAT ISSUE AS WELL, SO I THANK YOU 13 FOR THAT. 14 THIS CASE --15 MR. TURNER: YOUR HONOR, JUST --16 THE COURT: YES. 17 MR. TURNER: I AM SORRY, I GOT DISTRACTED. THERE IS A CALIFORNIA HEALTH DEPARTMENT LETTER 18 SAYING THAT JULY 1ST IS THE EFFECTIVE DATE. 19 20 THE COURT: RIGHT. OKAY. I HAVE THAT 21 CLARIFICATION --22 MR. TURNER: SORRY. 23 THE COURT: -- IN MIND AS SET OUT BY MR. RICH. 24 AS I UNDERSTAND THE FRAMING OF THE ISSUES, 25 MR. TURNER, YOU MAKE THE ARGUMENT THAT THIS CASE IS DIFFERENT FROM ALL THE OTHERS THAT THE DEFENDANTS CITE, ALL OF THE OTHER STATE OR FEDERAL CASES, BECAUSE IT INVOLVES THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION AND THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO EDUCATION. AM I CORRECT?

MR. TURNER: THAT IS CORRECT, YOUR HONOR.

THE COURT: THAT ISSUE OBVIOUSLY WOULD BE A STATE

ISSUE. IF THAT IS THE PRINCIPAL ISSUE WHY IS THIS CASE FILED

IN THIS COURT RATHER THAN STATE COURT?

MR. TURNER: WE ARE ALLEGING, IN ADDITION TO THE STATE CONSTITUTION, A FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EDUCATION AND TO EACH OF THE OTHER RIGHTS THAT WE HAVE CITED.

THE COURT: WOULDN'T IT BE A POSSIBILITY, THOUGH,
THAT WHEN THE COURT ADDRESSES THE MERITS, PERHAPS ON A

12(B)(6) DOWN THE ROAD, THE COURT COULD ADDRESS THE FEDERAL
CLAIMS ONLY, AND AS OFTEN IS DONE DISMISS THE STATE CLAIM.
AND IN THIS CASE, AS I UNDERSTAND THE ARGUMENTS, THE STATE
CLAIM IS REALLY THE PRINCIPAL CLAIM THAT YOU ARGUE
DISTINGUISHES THIS CASE.

MR. TURNER: WE HAVE -- THERE ARE A SERIES OF

FEDERAL CLAIMS THAT HAVE TO DO WITH THE WAY THAT THE

EXEMPTIONS, THE PERSONAL BELIEF EXEMPTIONS, ARE BEING APPLIED

TO STUDENTS WHO ARE DISABLED STUDENTS WHO ARE REQUIRED UNDER

FEDERAL LAW TO ATTEND SCHOOL. AND WE BELIEVE THAT THAT IS AN

IMPORTANT FEDERAL ISSUE THAT IS INVOLVED HERE.

IN ADDITION TO THAT THERE ARE SOME INDIVIDUALS WHO

ARE DISABLED AND SHOULD BE -- AND ARE REQUIRED TO ENTER SCHOOL WHO DO NOT HAVE A RECOGNIZED EXEMPTION UNDER SB 277. WE BELIEVE THOSE KINDS OF ISSUES MAKE THIS A FEDERAL CASE, PRIMARILY A FEDERAL CASE. AND WE ALSO ARE ALLEGING A FEDERAL RIGHT TO EDUCATION AS A PART OF OUR CASE.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT.

ON THE STANDARD OF REVIEW, WHICH IS OBVIOUSLY A SIGNIFICANT ISSUE HERE, YOU ARGUE THAT STRICT SCRUTINY APPLIES EVEN TO THE FEDERAL CLAIMS BECAUSE OF THE HYBRID RIGHTS THEORY. IS THAT --

MR. TURNER: THAT IS CORRECT.

THE COURT: -- FAIR?

AND HERE THE ARGUMENT IS THAT YOU HAVE ALLEGED FREE EXERCISE CLAIMS IN COMBINATION WITH COLORABLE EQUAL PROTECTION, DUE PROCESS AND RELATED CLAIMS; AND, THEREFORE, UNDER THE SMITH CASE AND RELEVANT NINTH CIRCUIT CASE LAW UNDER THE HYBRID RIGHTS THEORY STRICT SCRUTINY WOULD APPLY.

MR. TURNER: THAT IS ONE OF THE PRIMARY REASONS FOR STRICT SCRUTINY, YES.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT.

SO LET'S ASSUME STRICT SCRUTINY FOR A MOMENT. DO
YOU AGREE THAT IT IS LONG-SETTLED, FROM THE FEDERAL COURTS,
STARTING WITH THE SUPREME COURT IN 1905, THAT STATES CAN
PROPERLY EXERCISE POLICE POWERS AND COMPEL VACCINATION OF
SCHOOL CHILDREN?

MR. TURNER: WE DO NOT CHALLENGE THE RIGHT OF THE STATE TO COMPEL VACCINATION. WHAT WE ARE SAYING IS THAT THE MANNER IN WHICH THAT RIGHT, THAT POWER, IS EXERCISED IS A ISSUE THAT IS SUBJECT TO STRICT SCRUTINY.

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SO, FOR EXAMPLE, THE SITUATION THAT WE HAVE IN -UNDER THE CURRENT SB 277, WE HAVE A SITUATION WHERE IT IS
REPLACING OR IT IS MOVING FORWARD AND EXPANDING ACTIONS THAT
WERE TAKEN TWO YEARS EARLIER UNDER -- ACTUALLY IT WAS PASSED
IN 2012 AND THEN BECAME FINALIZED ON JANUARY 1, 2014, AB 2109,
WHICH PUT BURDENS ON THE PERSONAL BELIEF EXEMPTION, BURDENS
WHICH ARE CONSTITUTIONAL, WHICH PASS STRICT SCRUTINY.

AND IT IS INCUMBENT UPON THE STATE IN A SITUATION WHERE THEY ARE NOW GOING TO ADD FURTHER ENCUMBRANCES, IN FACT EXTINGUISH A RIGHT UNDER SB 277, THEY NEED TO, UNDER STRICT SCRUTINY, PRESENT A COMPELLING STATE INTEREST FOR THE ADDITIONAL BURDENS THAT THEY ARE PUTTING ON THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION.

SO WE ARE NOT CHALLENGING THE STATE'S RIGHT OR POWER TO MANDATE VACCINATION; WE ARE SAYING THAT IT HAS TO BE DONE IN A WAY THAT DOES NOT BURDEN THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION IN AN UNREASONABLE WAY.

THE COURT: YOU AGREE, THEN, THAT THAT STATE CAN COMPEL VACCINATION OF SCHOOL CHILDREN BY PRECLUDING THE ENROLLMENT OF SCHOOL CHILDREN WHO DO NOT VACCINATE.

MR. TURNER: I AM SORRY. COULD YOU REPEAT THAT?

THE COURT: SO YOU AGREE THAT THE STATE CAN COMPEL 1 2 VACCINATION OF SCHOOL CHILDREN AND DO SO BY PRECLUDING CHILDREN WHO DO NOT SHOW PROOF OF VACCINATION. 3 MR. TURNER: THAT, I BELIEVE, IS AN OPEN QUESTION. 4 5 THAT IS ONE OF THE QUESTIONS THAT IS BEFORE THE COURT IN OUR 6 MAIN INJUNCTION CASE. 7 THE ARGUMENT IS THAT, YES, THERE ARE SITUATIONS IN WHICH THE STATE CAN DO THAT. 8 9 THE COURT: THERE ARE SITUATIONS THAT IT CAN BE DONE, BUT YOU WOULD ARGUE IT HAS TO COMPLY WITH STRICT 10 11 SCRUTINY. 12 MR. TURNER: CORRECT. 13 THE COURT: ZUCHT, FOR EXAMPLE, THE U.S. SUPREME 14 COURT CASE FROM 1922, IS CLEAR ON THIS PROPOSITION THAT A STATE CAN FORCE OR COMPEL VACCINATION OF SCHOOL CHILDREN AND 15 16 PRECLUDE CHILDREN FROM COMING TO SCHOOL IF THEY DON'T SHOW 17 PROOF OF VACCINATION. 18 MR. TURNER: THAT CASE DID NOT REACH THE 19 CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES. 20 THE COURT: ALTHOUGH THERE WERE DUE PROCESS AND 21 EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS RAISED THAT THEY APPEARED TO DISCOUNT. 22 MR. TURNER: THEY ACTUALLY DECIDED IT ON PROCEDURAL 23 GROUNDS. THERE WAS NOT -- THEY SAID THAT THE ISSUE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION HAD NOT BEEN PUT BEFORE THEM SO THEY 24

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DID NOT HAVE TO ADDRESS IT.

THE COURT: BUT THEY LET STAND THE SAN ANTONIO

ORDINANCE WHICH FORCED VACCINATION OF SCHOOL CHILDREN, AND THE

PENALTY BEING IF THERE WAS NOT PROOF OF A VACCINATION THE

CHILD WOULD NOT BE ADMITTED INTO SCHOOL.

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MR. TURNER: THAT IS CORRECT. BUT THE ISSUE WAS NOT BEFORE THE COURT IN THE WAY IT WAS PRESENTED ON -- THAT IT WAS PRESENTED BY, AND SO THE COURT DID NOT REACH THE QUESTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY, AND I THINK ACTUALLY SAID THAT.

BUT, IN ADDITION, THAT WAS A PERIOD PRIOR TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRICT SCRUTINY TYPE OF STANDARD THAT IS BEING APPLIED IN LAW NOW, THE LAST COUPLE OF DECADES, SO THAT WE DON'T THINK IT ACTUALLY PROVIDES THE ANSWER TO THE STRICT SCRUTINY QUESTION THAT WE BELIEVE IS BEFORE THE COURT.

THE COURT: THERE IS AUTHORITY FOR THE PROPOSITION

THAT -- AND IT HAS BEEN CITED, I THINK, TO PRINCE AND PHILLIPS

AND WORKMAN, THE SECOND AND FOURTH CIRCUIT CASES,

RESPECTIVELY -- THAT MANDATORY VACCINATION CAN BE PURSUED

CONSTITUTIONALLY BY A STATE AND IT CAN BE REQUIRED EVEN

WITHOUT PROVIDING A FREE EXERCISE EXEMPTION. DO YOU DISPUTE

THAT?

MR. TURNER: WELL, FIRST OF ALL, THE CASES THAT ARE CITED WOULD DEAL WITH SUCH THINGS AS BEING REMOVED FROM SCHOOL DURING THE TIME OF AN OUTBREAK; NOT PERMANENTLY FOR THE ENTIRE SCHOOL PERIOD, 13 YEARS, WHATEVER IT TURNS OUT TO BE.

SO WE BELIEVE THAT THOSE CASES -- WE BELIEVE THAT

ONE NEEDS TO APPLY STRICT SCRUTINY TO THE SITUATION THAT IS
BEFORE US. AND WE BELIEVE THAT THOSE CASES MIGHT VERY WELL
PASS THAT STRICT SCRUTINY TEST, POSSIBLY; THE IDEA BEING THAT
THEY ARE BEING EXCLUDED FROM SCHOOL FOR A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME
IN ONE OF THOSE PLACES.

IT IS A REASONABLE WAY TO HANDLE A PART OF THE PROBLEM THAT MAY OCCUR. AND IT IS A PIECE OF WHAT WAS IN AB 2109 WHICH WE ARE SAYING IS THE STATUS QUO MANDATE, AND THAT IS WHAT WE WANT TO SEE BROUGHT BACK INTO FORCE WHILE THIS CASE IS DECIDED IN THE DETAILS OF THE PERMANENT INJUNCTION.

THE COURT: SO YOU WOULD ARGUE THAT THOSE CASES ARE DISTINGUISHABLE BECAUSE THEY INVOLVE TEMPORARY BANS.

MR. TURNER: CORRECT.

THE COURT: AND THERE ARE SOME STATE CASES, I THINK
IN ARKANSAS AND MISSISSIPPI, THAT I BELIEVE INVOLVE PERMANENT
BANS, BUT YOU WOULD ARGUE THAT THOSE ARE WRONGLY DECIDED.

MR. TURNER: THEY ARE VERY DIFFERENT CASES IN

MISSISSIPPI AND -- THE CASE IN MISSISSIPPI AND THE CASES IN

ARKANSAS ARE VERY DIFFERENT.

IN THE ARKANSAS CASE, MR. MOXLEY WAS AN ATTORNEY FOR THE PLAINTIFFS IN ARKANSAS, I WAS ATTORNEY FOR A GROUP THAT FILED AMICUS BRIEF.

WHAT HAPPENED IS THE TWO FEDERAL COURTS DECLARED THE RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT REQUIRED MEMBERSHIP IN A SPECIFIC RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION. THAT WAS

APPEALED TO THE CIRCUIT AND THE STATE, AND THE PLAINTIFFS CAME
TO AN AGREEMENT TO STAY THE OPERATION OF THE ABSENCE OF THE
EXEMPTION FOR THE DURATION OF THE LITIGATION. DURING THE
DURATION OF THE LITIGATION THE STATE LEGISLATURE PASSED A
PERSONAL BELIEF EXEMPTION ALMOST IDENTICAL TO WHAT CALIFORNIA
HAD IN PLACE UNTIL SB 277.

SO THOSE CASES DO NOT ACTUALLY SUPPORT THE ARGUMENT THAT THE STATE IS PUTTING FORTH IN TERMS OF THE TOTAL -TOTALITY OF THE REALITY OF THE SITUATION.

WITH REGARD TO MISSISSIPPI, THAT CASE IS -- AGAIN,
IT IS A CASE WHERE THERE WAS NO LEGISLATION INVOLVED, IT WAS
THE COURT LOOKING AT THE RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION. AND IT IS AN
OUTLYING CASE. IT DOES NOT REPRESENT THE KIND OF
JURISPRUDENCE THAT HAS BEEN GOING ON IN THE AREA OF
EXEMPTIONS.

AND WE THINK WE CAN DISTINGUISH IT IN PART, BUT AT THE SAME TIME WE DO NOT THINK THE ANALYSIS FOLLOWS. AND WE COULD WALK THROUGH THAT, IF THAT WAS NECESSARY.

THE COURT: DO YOU DISPUTE THAT A STATE LEGISLATURE

CAN REQUIRE VACCINATION OF SCHOOL CHILDREN WITHOUT PROVIDING A

FREE EXERCISE EXEMPTION?

MR. TURNER: WE ARE NOT RAISING THAT ISSUE HERE

BECAUSE WE HAVE A DIFFERENT SITUATION. THE SITUATION WE HAVE

IS A 55-YEAR HISTORY OF A PERSONAL BELIEF EXEMPTION WHICH WAS

ACTUALLY A VERY -- IT WAS DONE IN 1961 WHEN THE POLIO VACCINE

WAS FIRST MANDATED. AND IT WAS IN FACT A VERY ENLIGHTENED AND VERY SMART LEAD IN THE WAY THAT EXEMPTION LAW UNFOLDED BECAUSE IT BASICALLY WOVE TOGETHER A RELIGIOUS AND A PERSONAL BELIEF EXEMPTION. IT ALSO HAD MEDICAL EXEMPTIONS.

AND THAT PARTICULAR APPROACH, WE ARGUE, MEETS THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEST UNDER STRICT SCRUTINY; THAT IS, HAVING THE PERSONAL BELIEF EXEMPTION AND A MANDATE. IT WORKS, AND IT AVOIDS CERTAIN KINDS OF PUBLIC HEALTH PROBLEMS THAT MIGHT EXIST IF IT WASN'T DONE THAT WAY.

AND WE ARE SAYING THAT WE DON'T BELIEVE THAT -- WE ARE NOT CHALLENGING THE STRUCTURE THAT WAS SET UP UNDER AB 29 -- THE PREVIOUS LAW. BUT WE DO NOT -- WE ARE NOT SAYING FOR SURE THAT NO -- NO EXEMPTION OF A PERSONAL BELIEF KIND, THAT THAT KIND OF A LAW WOULD IN FACT WITHSTAND STRICT SCRUTINY. BUT THAT IS NOT THE ISSUE THAT WE ARE RAISING HERE.

THE COURT: HASN'T THE COURT, THOUGH, THROUGH PRINCE
AND SOME OF THESE OTHER CIRCUIT CASES, ALL OF THE CASE LAW HAS
INDICATED, THAT DISCUSSES THIS ISSUE, THAT STATES CAN REQUIRE
VACCINATION WITHOUT PROVIDING A FREE EXERCISE EXEMPTION?

MR. TURNER: I AM BEING HANDED A NOTE ON THIS.

FIRST OF ALL, I WANT TO JUST GO BACK AND RESTATE
THAT THE ISSUE HERE, IN OUR OPINION, THAT WE ARE URGING, IS
THAT THE RIGHT TO AN EDUCATION GUARANTEED BY THE CONSTITUTION
OF CALIFORNIA IS THE MEASURE OF THIS PIECE OF LEGISLATION.
CAN THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION BE TAKEN AWAY FROM STUDENTS AS A

WAY OF ENFORCING A STATE POLICY, ANY STATE POLICY, AND WHEN CAN IT DO THAT.

AND WE ARE SAYING THAT THE STRICT SCRUTINY OF THAT

QUESTION IS WHAT HAS TO BE APPLIED IN ORDER TO DETERMINE

WHETHER SB 277 WHICH -- THE ONLY EFFECT OF WHICH WAS TO REMOVE

THE PERSONAL BELIEF EXEMPTION, WHETHER THAT PIECE OF

LEGISLATION MEETS THE STRICT SCRUTINY TEST MEASURED AGAINST

THE RIGHT OF EDUCATION FOR CALIFORNIA STUDENTS.

THE COURT: THE ARGUMENT WOULD BE THAT IF A STATE

CAN REQUIRE VACCINATION WITHOUT A FREE EXERCISE EXEMPTION THEN

A STATE CERTAINLY COULD PROVIDE FOR MANDATORY VACCINATION OF

SCHOOL CHILDREN WITHOUT A PERSONAL BELIEF EXEMPTION, BECAUSE A

PERSONAL BELIEF EXEMPTION IS, AT ITS BEST, A FIRST AMENDMENT

FREE EXERCISE EXEMPTION. AND MORE COMMONLY IT IS SOMETHING

LESS THAN A FREE EXERCISE EXEMPTION, IT IS A PHILOSOPHICAL

PERSONALLY-HELD BELIEF BUT NOT NECESSARILY A RELIGIOUS BELIEF.

SO IF, UNDER THE EXISTING LAW, A STATE CAN REQUIRE VACCINATION WITHOUT PROVIDING FOR A FIRST AMENDMENT EXEMPTION, WHY CAN'T -- WHAT WOULD PRECLUDE THE STATE FROM REQUIRING VACCINATION OF SCHOOL CHILDREN WITHOUT EVEN GRANTING A PERSONAL BELIEF EXEMPTION?

MR. TURNER: WE BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE REQUIRED TO.

LET ME ASK YOU -- YOU WANTED ME TO SAY SOMETHING?

(DISCUSSION OFF THE RECORD)

MR. TURNER: OUR ARGUMENT IS THAT IN FACT THEY HAVE

TO HAVE AN EXEMPTION. 1 2 THE COURT: BECAUSE OF THE RIGHT OF EDUCATION? 3 MR. TURNER: NO, THAT'S PART OF IT. BUT WE ALSO ARE SAYING THEY HAVE A MEDICAL EXEMPTION. AND THE SMITH VERSUS 4 5 GONZALES CASE SAYS THAT WHERE YOU HAVE THE -- ONE KIND OF 6 EXEMPTION THE RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION HAS TO BE THERE AS WELL. YOU CAN'T HAVE A SECULAR EXEMPTION AND EXTINGUISH THE 7 RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION. AND IN THIS INSTANCE, INCIDENTALLY --8 9 THE COURT: WHAT CASE WAS THAT? MR. TURNER: IT IS OREGON VERSUS SMITH AND GONZALES. 10 11 THE COURT: DO YOU HAVE A CITE? 12 SO IS THE ARGUMENT THAT IF YOU HAVE A MEDICAL 13 EXEMPTION THEN YOU HAVE TO HAVE A FREE EXERCISE EXEMPTION 14 ALSO? 15 MR. TURNER: THAT'S OUR POSITION, YES. 16 THE COURT: AND WHY IS THAT? WHAT WOULD MAKE THAT 17 REQUIREMENT? 18 MR. TURNER: THAT -- LET ME JUST -- WOULD IT BE 19 POSSIBLE TO HEAR FROM ATTORNEY MOXLEY ON THAT POINT? 20 THE COURT: YES. 21 MR. MOXLEY: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 22 WE BELIEVE THAT THIS IS CONTROLLED BY THE SPECIFIC 23 EXEMPTION LAW EMANATING FROM THE U.S. SUPREME COURT. AND WE 24 BELIEVE THAT SMITH VERSUS OREGON, WHICH IS THE PEYOTE CASE,

EVEN THOUGH IT, IN THE CASE OF A GENERALLY APPLICABLE LAW,

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TOOK AWAY STRICT SCRUTINY, IT MAINTAINED STRICT SCRUTINY IN EXEMPTION AREAS. AND IT SPECIFICALLY HOLDS THAT ANY TIME THERE IS A SECULAR EXEMPTION THAT THE REFUSAL TO GIVE A FIRST AMENDMENT EXEMPTION AS WELL IS SUBJECT TO THE STRICTEST OF SCRUTINY.

THEN THE GONZALES CASE IS THE DEA CASE WHERE THE

COURT DID UPHOLD THE CREATION OF A RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION TO -
FOR THE SACRAMENTAL USE OF A SOUTH AMERICAN PSYCHEDELIC DRUG

CALLED WASKA. AND IT FOLLOWED OREGON VERSUS SMITH WITH THE

DOCTRINE THAT IF A SECULAR EXEMPTION IS AVAILABLE STRICT

SCRUTINY REQUIRES THAT FIRST AMENDMENT EXEMPTIONS BE SEEN WITH

THE SAME DEGREE OF DIGNITY.

AND IN FACT THAT DOCTRINE, IN BETWEEN THE TIME OF OREGON VERSUS SMITH AND THE GONZALES CASE, WAS APPLIED IN THE NEWARK CASE, THE NEWARK FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE VERSUS CITY OF NEWARK.

THE COURT: LET ME ASK A QUESTION HERE.

I AM AWARE THAT IF YOU PROVIDE AN EXEMPTION YOU HAVE
TO DO IT CORRECTLY. SO THE SHERR CASE, FOR EXAMPLE, THE NEW
YORK DISTRICT COURT CASE, STRUCK DOWN THE EXEMPTION BECAUSE IT
SAID FOR CERTAIN RELIGIONS YOU HAVE AN EXEMPTION, FOR OTHERS
YOU DON'T, BASICALLY, AND THAT WOULD BE IMPROPER.

BUT THE QUESTION I HAVE IS, DO YOU EVEN HAVE TO

PROVIDE AN EXEMPTION? THERE ARE A NUMBER OF CASES -- PRINCE

AND WORKMAN AND PHILLIPS AND PERHAPS OTHERS -- THAT SEEM TO BE

SAYING THE STATE CAN REQUIRE VACCINATION OF SCHOOL CHILDREN WITHOUT EVEN PROVIDING A FREE EXERCISE EXEMPTION.

MR. MOXLEY: WE FRANKLY DO BELIEVE THOSE CASES ARE WRONG. WE BELIEVE THOSE CASES ARE COMPLETELY CONTRARY TO OREGON VERSUS SMITH AND TO THE GONZALES CASE. AND WE BELIEVE THAT THEY CUT AGAINST THE GRAIN OF ALL OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE THERE IS EXCEPT FOR VACCINATIONS. WE THINK THAT VACCINATIONS ARE SOMEWHAT OF A SACRED COW.

BUT IF YOU LOOK AT THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

JURISPRUDENCE THAT HAS SUCCEEDED JACOBSON BY YEARS AND YEARS

AND YEARS, AND IF YOU LOOK EVEN BACK TO THE OLDEST RELIGIOUS

EXEMPTION CASES, SHERBERT VERSUS VERNER, WISCONSIN VERSUS

YODER, CASES THAT IN THE HYBRID RIGHTS DISCUSSION OF THE

SUPREME COURT HAVE STILL BEEN SAID TO HAVE COMPLETE VITALITY,

THOSE ARE STRICT SCRUTINY CASES AND THEY REQUIRE INDIVIDUAL

STRICT SCRUTINY.

THEY BASICALLY SAY THAT -- WELL, THERE IS ANOTHER

CASE HERE THAT COUNTS A LOT AND IT IS A CHURCH OF THE LUKUMI

BABALU AYE. THAT CASE SAYS THAT ANY LAW THAT TARGETS A

RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION HAS TO BE LOOKED AT WITH THE GREATEST OF

STRICT SCRUTINY.

AND WE BELIEVE THAT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THIS CASE
AND VARIOUS OTHER CASES IS THAT WE ARE NOT FOCUSED ON THE
POWER OF THE STATE TO MANDATE VACCINATIONS, WE ARE FOCUSED ON
THE UNIQUE ASPECT OF THIS LEGISLATION WHICH IS NEW -- THERE

HAS NEVER BEEN LEGISLATION THAT SAYS WE WILL ABOLISH
OBJECTIONS, ABOLISH CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTIONS AND BY EXTENSION
ABOLISH RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS.

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SO WE BELIEVE THAT THE BROAD BRUSH OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT COVERS THE GREAT, GREAT MAJORITY OF ALL OF THESE EXEMPTION CLAIMS.

AND REALLY THE ONLY OTHER SPECIES OF EXEMPTION

CLAIM, YOUR HONOR, IS MEDICAL EXEMPTIONS. THE ANIMUS OF ANY

PERSONAL BELIEF EXEMPTION THAT IS NOT ROOTED IN

CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED CONSCIENCE IS ROOTED IN

CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED CONCERN FOR THE WELL-BEING OF

CHILDREN, AND THAT PARENTS ARE ABSOLUTELY PRESUMED UNDER

TROXEL VERSUS GRANVILLE AND GOING ALL THE WAY BACK TO PRINCE,

LOTS AND LOTS OF CASES PRESUME THAT PARENTS ARE ACTING IN THE

BEST INTEREST OF THEIR CHILDREN.

SO FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION PURPOSES WE BELIEVE
THAT THE STATE WOULD HAVE TO SOMEHOW PROVE, OR PUT ON A PRIMA
FACIE CASE TO SHOW, THAT THE PARENTS THAT WE REPRESENT ARE NOT
ACTING IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THEIR CHILDREN IN ORDER TO
CARRY THEIR BURDEN TO RESIST A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.

THE COURT: ON THE ISSUE OF -- IF WE ASSUME THAT

THERE ARE CASES -- AND PRINCE PERHAPS MAY BE ONE OF THEM.

PRINCE HAS THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE: THE RIGHT TO PRACTICE

RELIGION FREELY DOES NOT INCLUDE LIBERTY TO EXPOSE THE

COMMUNITY OR THE CHILD TO COMMUNICABLE DISEASES, OR THE LATTER

TO ILL HEALTH OR DEATH.

THAT LANGUAGE HAS BEEN CITED BY WORKMAN AND PHILLIPS

AND OTHER CASES TO STATE THAT A STATE CAN REQUIRE VACCINATION

OF CHILDREN WITHOUT A FREE EXERCISE EXEMPTION.

LET'S ASSUME THAT THAT IS A CORRECT STATEMENT OF THE LAW, THAT THE STATE CAN REQUIRE VACCINATION AND NOT PROVIDE A FREE EXERCISE EXEMPTION. WOULDN'T THAT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT A STATE CAN PROVIDE FOR MANDATORY VACCINATION AND NOT PROVIDE FOR PERSONAL BELIEF EXEMPTION?

MR. MOXLEY: LET ME RESPOND TO THAT.

THE COURT: YES.

MR. TURNER: THERE ARE TWO THINGS.

FIRST OF ALL, THE STANDARD THAT YOU READ, WE ARE SAYING THEY HAVE TO PROVE IT. THEY HAVE TO PROVE THAT WHAT THEY ARE DOING BY REMOVING THESE PERSONAL BELIEF EXEMPTIONS FITS THAT STANDARD. WE ARE SAYING THEY HAVE NOT DONE THAT; AND NOT ONLY THAT, THEY CANNOT DO THAT.

THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT REMOVING THESE PERSONAL

BELIEF EXEMPTIONS IN FACT IMPROVES THE HEALTH OF THE

COMMUNITY; AND IN FACT WE WOULD ARGUE IN SOME INSTANCES IT MAY

ACTUALLY UNDERMINE THE HEALTH OF THE COMMUNITY.

THE COURT: THAT ARGUMENT CONCEDES THAT A STATE CAN REQUIRE VACCINATION WITHOUT A PERSONAL BELIEF EXEMPTION.

MR. TURNER: I ACCEPTED YOU PRESENTED THAT AS THE PREMISE OF YOUR QUESTION.

THE COURT: YES. 1 2 MR. TURNER: I WAS SAYING ACCEPTING THAT PREMISE, 3 EVEN WITH THAT PREMISE THERE IS A STANDARD THAT HAS TO BE MET IN ORDER FOR THE STATE TO ACTUALLY DO WHAT WAS SAID IN THAT --4 5 IN WHAT YOU READ. 6 THE COURT: YES. MR. TURNER: AND NOW ALSO I JUST WANT TO MENTION, IF 7 I COULD, ATTORNEY ROSENBERG, KIM ROSENBERG, WOULD LIKE TO 8 9 SPEAK ON THAT POINT. IS THAT POSSIBLE? THE COURT: YES. 10 11 MS. ROSENBERG: THANK YOU VERY MUCH, YOUR HONOR. 12 THE COURT: YOU ARE WELCOME. 13 MR. MOXLEY: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 14 MR. TURNER: ALSO, YOUR HONOR, I DO HAVE THE CITATIONS FOR THOSE CASES IF YOU WOULD LIKE THEM. 15 16 THE COURT: YES. BEFORE WE CLOSE I WOULD LIKE 17 THOSE. 18 MS. ROSENBERG: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. I APPRECIATE 19 YOUR INDULGENCE IN ALLOWING ME TO SPEAK. 20 IN OUR PERSPECTIVE MANDATES AREN'T THE ISSUE HERE. 21 SB 277 DOESN'T ACTUALLY TOUCH THE MANDATES UNDER CALIFORNIA 22 LAW, THE MANDATES THAT WERE UNDER HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE 23 120325(A)(1) THROUGH (10) AND 120335(A)(1) THROUGH (10) REMAIN 24 IN PLACE, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE INJUNCTION ISSUES OR NOT.

WE BELIEVE THAT THE COMPELLING INTEREST, STATE

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INTEREST, THAT THEY NEED TO SHOW TO SURVIVE STRICT SCRUTINY IS

A COMPELLING INTEREST IN REMOVING PERSONAL BELIEF EXEMPTIONS.

AND WE BELIEVE THEY HAVEN'T AND CANNOT MEET THAT HERE.

IN PART ONE ISSUE IS THAT PERSONAL BELIEF EXEMPTIONS WERE ACTUALLY DECLINING UNDER AB 2109, AND THEY WENT FROM 3.15 PERCENT IN 2013/2014 DOWN TO 2.4 PERCENT THE FOLLOWING YEAR.

AND LAST YEAR THEY WERE DOWN TO 2.38 PERCENT.

SO AB 2109 WAS, WHILE PUTTING BURDENS ON FAMILIES TO GO TO DOCTORS IN ORDER TO OBTAIN PBE'S, WAS STILL ALLOWING THEM TO EXERCISE THAT FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT AND WAS ALSO REDUCING THE RATE OF PERSONAL BELIEF EXEMPTIONS. SO THERE WAS A BURDEN BUT IT WASN'T AN UNDUE BURDEN. AND IT WAS A SUCCESSFUL AND -- WAS A SUCCESSFUL LAW WHILE IT WAS IN PLACE, AND BALANCED THE INTERESTS OF THE STATE AND THE PERSONAL FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS OF FAMILIES AND INDIVIDUALS.

BUT THE OTHER ISSUE, YOUR HONOR, IS THAT THERE

ARE -- EVEN WITHOUT THE PERSONAL BELIEF EXEMPTION THERE ARE

EXEMPTIONS IN SB 277 IN ADDITION TO THE MEDICAL EXEMPTION.

THERE ARE EXEMPTIONS FOR IEP STUDENTS. THAT CREATES ISSUES

THAT WE RAISED IN OUR PAPER WITH RESPECT TO 504 STUDENTS AND

EQUAL PROTECTION AS WELL. BUT THERE ARE EXEMPTIONS FOR IEP

STUDENTS.

THERE ARE EXEMPTIONS FOR HOME SCHOOLERS WHO CHOOSE
HOME SCHOOLING AS THEIR EDUCATIONAL CHOICE. THERE ARE
EXEMPTIONS FOR STUDENTS ENGAGED IN INDEPENDENT STUDY.

AND THERE ARE EXEMPTIONS FOR EVERY STUDENT EXCEPT STUDENTS IN KINDERGARTEN AND 7TH GRADE WHO ARE THE STUDENTS WHO WILL BE EXCLUDED FROM SCHOOL THIS YEAR IF AN INJUNCTION DOESN'T ISSUE. BUT STUDENTS IN FIRST GRADE, SECOND GRADE, SIXTH GRADE, WHO ARE REALLY NO DIFFERENT -- AND, YOU KNOW, EIGHTH GRADE THROUGH 12TH GRADE, REALLY NO DIFFERENT THAN THE KINDERGARTENERS OR 7TH GRADERS, ARE BEING ALLOWED TO REMAIN IN SCHOOL WITH THEIR PERSONAL BELIEF EXEMPTIONS.

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THE COURT: DOESN'T THAT, THOUGH, JUST ALLOW FOR AN ORDERLY PROCESS; IN OTHER WORDS, IT GIVES TIME. INSTEAD OF 200,000 CHILDREN ALL AT ONCE, IT IS 33,000 AND THEN STAIR-STEPS, BASICALLY.

MS. ROSENBERG: FRANKLY, YOUR HONOR, WE BELIEVE THAT IS A MATTER OF ADMINISTRATIVE EASE. THERE IS NO REAL COMPELLING INTEREST IN DOING THAT. THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE FROM A PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVE IF THEY ARE ARGUING THAT THESE CHILDREN PRESENT A PUBLIC HEALTH RISK. THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE.

AND WE DISPUTE THAT, YOUR HONOR, BY THE WAY,

VEHEMENTLY. THESE CHILDREN ARE HEALTHY CHILDREN. THEY ARE

NOT VECTORS OF DISEASE, THEY DO NOT CARRY DISEASES. THEY ARE

NOT PRESENTING A PUBLIC HEALTH RISK. BUT THERE IS NO

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A 7TH GRADER AND A 6TH GRADER, OR A 7TH

GRADER AND AN 11TH GRADER, SO THERE IS NO LEGITIMATE INTEREST

AND COMPELLING INTEREST IN THAT GRANDFATHERING PROGRAM.

THE COURT: SO MAYBE I WOULD LIKE TO FOLLOW UP WITH YOU.

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AGAIN, THIS REQUIRES THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE
PROPOSITION THAT THERE IS CASE LAW THAT INDICATES YOU CAN HAVE
MANDATORY VACCINATION WITHOUT PROVIDING A FREE EXERCISE
EXEMPTION.

IF THAT IS THE LAW, THEN A STATE COULD REQUIRE

VACCINATION WITHOUT PROVIDING A PERSONAL BELIEF EXEMPTION.

AND IF THAT IS THE CASE, WHAT WOULD BE IMPERMISSIBLE,

UNLAWFUL, UNCONSTITUTIONAL, IN TAKING AWAY THAT WHICH IS NOT

REQUIRED IN THE FIRST INSTANCE. SO, IN OTHER WORDS, IF A PBE

IS NOT REQUIRED UNDER THE LAW, CALIFORNIA NEVER HAD TO GIVE IT

IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, HOW CAN IT BE IMPROPER TO TAKE IT AWAY?

MS. ROSENBERG: WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPROPER TO TAKE IT AWAY WHEN THE STATE LEAVES IN PLACE A VARIETY OF OTHER EXEMPTIONS THAT ALLOWS STUDENTS TO ATTEND SCHOOL. AND THOSE EXEMPTIONS -- IT INVOLVES AN ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER WITH -- JACOBSON IS ACTUALLY VERY CLEAR IS NOT ALLOWED. POLICE POWER CAN GO UP TO -- UP TO A POINT, BUT WHEN IT OVERSTEPS THOSE BOUNDS AND BECOMES ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS THEN IT IS NOT ALLOWABLE.

AND WE BELIEVE THAT THAT IS EXACTLY WHAT SB 277 HAS

DONE FOR THE REASONS THAT I STATED REGARDING THE VARIOUS TYPES

OF EXEMPTIONS THAT IT ALLOWS AND DOESN'T ALLOW.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. SO IF I UNDERSTAND THE

RESPONSE IT IS THAT THE PROBLEM HERE IS THAT THE REMOVAL OF THE PBE, EVEN IF IT DIDN'T HAVE TO BE GRANTED IN THE BEGINNING, IT HAS TO BE DONE IN A MANNER THAT COMPORTS WITH STRICT SCRUTINY.

MS. ROSENBERG: PRECISELY, YOUR HONOR.

YOUR HONOR, IF I COULD ADDRESS -- YOU HAD RAISED SOME OF THE CASES, PRINCE AND JACOBSON, PHILLIPS.

THE COURT: YES.

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MS. ROSENBERG: PHILLIPS IS A NEW YORK CASE THAT NEW YORK HAS A RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION TO VACCINATION, IT IS BASED ON SINCERE -- PERSONAL AND SINCERE RELIGIOUS BELIEFS.

THE PHILLIPS CASE ADDRESSED A VERY LIMITED ISSUE WITH RESPECT TO WHETHER STUDENTS WITH RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS COULD BE EXCLUDED FROM SCHOOL DURING AN OUTBREAK. THAT IS WHAT THE LAW IS UNDER AB 2109 AS WELL. WE ARE NOT DISPUTING THAT. THAT WAS THE SAME WITH THE MARICOPA CASE THAT DEFENDANTS RELIED ON.

WORKMAN DOES NOT ADDRESS THE FUNDAMENTAL EDUCATIONAL ISSUE THAT IS AT STAKE HERE AND DOES NOT ENGAGE IN A STRICT SCRUTINY ANALYSIS. AND A NUMBER OF THE OTHER CASES THAT THEY CITE ARE SIMILARLY DISTINGUISHABLE.

PRINCE WAS A CASE -- IT IS ACTUALLY IRONIC THAT THEY CITE PRINCE. PRINCE WAS A CASE THAT WAS WORKING TO GET CHILDREN BACK INTO SCHOOL; NOT KEEP THEM OUT OF SCHOOL. AND THEY ARE USING IT TO TRY TO EXCLUDE CHILDREN FROM SCHOOL NOW.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT.

ON THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO EDUCATION UNDER THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION, WHAT IS THE RESPONSE TO THE ARGUMENT THAT THAT RIGHT REMAINS, IT IS A ROBUST RIGHT. THAT RIGHT IS PROVIDED BY THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION, IT WAS NOT PROVIDED BY THE PERSONAL BELIEF EXEMPTION. SO IF IT IS NOT BEING PROVIDED BY THE PERSONAL BELIEF EXEMPTION, IF ONE REMOVES THE PBE HOW IS THAT A VIOLATION OF A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT. IT IS THE REMOVAL OF A STATUTORY RIGHT THAT NEVER CONFERRED A RIGHT TO EDUCATION, RATHER THAT IS A CONSTITUTIONAL STAND-ALONE RIGHT.

MS. ROSENBERG: YOUR HONOR, I BELIEVE THAT BY
REMOVING THE PBE IT PREVENTS CHILDREN FROM ACTUALLY ACCESSING
EDUCATION AND TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO A PUBLIC -- TO A CLASSROOM-BASED EDUCATION. WITHOUT THE
PBE THEY CANNOT ACCESS EDUCATION TO WHICH THEY ARE ENTITLED.

THE COURT: ULTIMATELY, AS I UNDERSTAND THE ARGUMENT, IN PRACTICAL TERMS, THE QUARREL WITH REPEALING THE PBE IS THAT IT FORCES A HOBSON'S CHOICE ON PARENTS; THAT IS, TO VACCINATE THEIR CHILDREN, OR NOT. IF THEY CHOOSE THE LATTER THEN THEIR OPTION IS HOME SCHOOLING. AND THAT THAT HOBSON'S CHOICE IS FUNDAMENTALLY UNFAIR AND DOES NOT PASS STRICT SCRUTINY.

MS. ROSENBERG: CORRECT, YOUR HONOR.

I THINK, AS WE DEMONSTRATED IN OUR PAPERS AND IN THE VARIOUS DECLARATIONS FROM OUR PLAINTIFFS, PLAINTIFFS WILL BE

IRREPARABLY HARMED BY THIS. A NUMBER OF PLAINTIFFS, MANY OF WHOM ARE HERE TODAY, THE NICOLAISENS, FOR EXAMPLE, HAVE DEMONSTRATED VERY CLEARLY IN THEIR DECLARATIONS THAT THEY CANNOT AFFORD TO HOME SCHOOL. THAT HOME SCHOOLING IS REQUIRING THEM TO MAKE VERY DIFFERENT CHOICES.

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VERONICA DELGADO SIMILARLY HAS A NUMBER OF CHILDREN,
HAS EXPRESSED THE MEANS IN WHICH HOME SCHOOLING WOULD BE VERY
CHALLENGING FOR HER. SHE HAS TWO CHILDREN WITH IEP'S, THAT
CREATES ADDITIONAL CHALLENGES.

AND, YOUR HONOR, IF I MAY. YOU MENTIONED THAT

PARENTS WOULD HAVE TO CHOOSE BETWEEN VACCINATING AND SENDING

THEIR CHILDREN TO SCHOOL. MANY OF THESE CHILDREN -- ALL OF

OUR PLAINTIFFS HAVE CHILDREN WHO ARE PARTIALLY VACCINATED.

THESE ARE NOT FULLY UNVACCINATED CHILDREN.

I THINK IT IS A MISNOMER THAT IS CARRIED THROUGH IN DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENTS. AND THESE CHILDREN ARE NOT -- AGAIN, THEY ARE NOT VECTORS OF DISEASE. MANY OF THEM HAVE RECEIVED ALMOST ALL OF THE VACCINES REQUIRED.

PARENTS ARE REALLY ENGAGING IN PRECISE -- PRECISION MEDICINE IN ORDER TO MAKE THE BEST CHOICES IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THEIR CHILDREN AND THEIR CHILDREN'S HEALTH. AND THE STATE HAS GIVEN NO EVIDENCE THAT THE PARENTS -- AS MR. MOXLEY SAID, NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER THAT THE PARENTS AREN'T ACTING IN THEIR CHILDREN'S BEST INTEREST.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. AND THAT IS A FAIR

DISTINCTION. I UNDERSTAND THAT, THAT MOST OF THE CHILDREN ARE PARTIALLY VACCINATED AND PARENTS ARE PARSING WHICH VACCINES THEY WOULD LIKE TO CHALLENGE AMONG THE 10 ENUMERATED VACCINES.

MS. ROSENBERG: IN FACT, YOUR HONOR, FOR SOME OF OUR PLAINTIFFS IT IS NOT EVEN THAT THEY ARE CHOOSING SOME VACCINES OR NOT OTHER VACCINES. SOME WOULD PREFER, FOR HEALTH REASONS AND BASED ON THEIR OWN CHILDREN'S MEDICAL CONDITIONS, TO VACCINATE THEIR CHILDREN ON A SLOWER SCHEDULE. MS. LOY, FOR EXAMPLE, IS ONE SUCH PLAINTIFF, AND DR. SCHUTZE-ALVA IS ANOTHER, WHO ARE VACCINATING THEIR CHILDREN ON A SLOWER SCHEDULE. THEIR SCHOOLS WERE UNWILLING TO ACCEPT LETTERS FROM THEIR DOCTORS INDICATING THAT THESE CHILDREN WERE WORKING TOWARD COMPLIANCE WITH VACCINATION MANDATES BUT WERE DOING SO ON A DIFFERENT SCHEDULE.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU.

LET ME ASK A FEW QUESTIONS OF MR. RICH, AND THEN WE CAN CIRCLE BACK TO PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL.

MR. RICH, DO YOU AGREE THAT STRICT SCRUTINY APPLIES WITH RESPECT TO THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM?

MR. RICH: IF THIS CASE IMPLICATED THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION UNDER THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION IT WOULD; BUT OUR POSITION IS THAT IT DOES NOT.

THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION IS A RIGHT THAT BELONGS TO THE CHILDREN. THE OBLIGATION TO ENROLL CHILDREN IN SCHOOL CORRESPONDS TO THAT RIGHT. THAT OBLIGATION BELONGS TO THE

PARENTS. SPECIFICALLY UNDER THE CALIFORNIA EDUCATION CODE
UNDER SECTION 48216 THAT PARENTS HAVE TO CONFORM TO THE
MANDATORY VACCINATION STATUTE WHEN DECIDING WHETHER TO ENROLL
THEIR KIDS, AND SECTION 48293 WHICH MAKES IT A VIOLATION OF
LAW NOT TO ENROLL YOUR CHILD WHEN TO DO SO IS COMPELLED BY
STATE STATUTE.

SO I THINK THAT THE -- WITH ALL DUE RESPECT TO PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL, I BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE IMPROPERLY CONFLATING THESE TWO ISSUES.

SB 277 DOES NOT TARGET THE CHILDREN'S RIGHT TO AN EDUCATION INSOFAR AS IT IS PRECLUDING CHILDREN FROM BEING EDUCATED; SB 277 IS TARGETED TO THE PARENTS' OBLIGATION TO PROPERLY ENROLL THEIR CHILDREN WITHIN THE CONFINES OF THE LAW.

IF IN FACT A PARENT DOES NOT COMPLY WITH SB 277, IT IS NOT THE CHILD WHO IS BEING PUNISHED. THE CHILD IS NOT, AS A MATTER OF LAW, BEING DEPRIVED OF THEIR RIGHT TO AN EDUCATION; IT IS THE PARENT WHO IS IN VIOLATION OF LAW, IT IS THE PARENT WHO IS SUBJECT TO PENALTY, AND IT IS BECAUSE IT IS THE PARENT WHO IS MAKING THAT DECISION ON BEHALF OF THE CHILD.

SB 277, THEREFORE, DOES NOT INFRINGE UPON ANY CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF CHILDREN TO AN EDUCATION. TO THE CONTRARY, AS WE HAVE ARGUED, IT IS INTENDED TO PROMOTE THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION OF EVERY CHILD IN CALIFORNIA SO THAT THEY CAN RECEIVE AN EDUCATION IN A SAFE AND HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT.

SO BEFORE WE EVEN GET TO THE LEVEL OF SCRUTINY THE

FIRST STEP IS TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS ACTUALLY AN INFRINGEMENT OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT. AND WITH ALL DUE RESPECT TO PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL, WE INSIST THAT THAT FIRST STEP HAS NOT BEEN MET HERE.

NOW, IF YOUR HONOR WOULD LIKE I CAN ADDRESS, UNDER WHAT WE BELIEVE IS THE FALSE ASSUMPTION THAT THERE IS AN INFRINGEMENT, WE DO BELIEVE THAT THE STATUTE SATISFIES STRICT SCRUTINY, ALTHOUGH IT NEED NOT DO SO.

THE COURT: AND THE ARGUMENT THERE, FROM THE
BRIEFING, IS THAT THERE IS THE COMPELLING INTEREST OF
PREVENTING CONTAGIOUS DISEASES, AND THAT THIS LAW IS NARROWLY
TAILORED IN THAT IT IDENTIFIES THE 10 DISEASES.

MR. RICH: CORRECT. IT IS NARROWLY TAILORED BECAUSE IT IDENTIFIES 10 DISEASES.

THERE IS A PROVISION OF SB 277 IN FACT, YOUR HONOR,

THAT STILL PERMITS PBE'S. IT IS -- IF YOU GIVE ME A MOMENT I

WILL FIND THE CITATION.

BUT IT IS HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE SECTION 120338,
WHICH SPECIFICALLY STATES THAT PBE'S -- THAT THE ELIMINATION
OF THE PBE EXEMPTION APPLIES ONLY TO THE 10 IDENTIFIED
DISEASES IN SB 277.

THERE IS A CATCH-ALL PROVISION, PARAGRAPH NO. 11 OF
120335 AND 120325, WHICH PERMITS MANDATORY VACCINATIONS FOR
ADDITIONAL DISEASES WITHIN THE DISCRETION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC HEALTH SO LONG AS IT COMPLIES WITH VARIOUS NATIONAL

STANDARDS. SECTION 120338 SPECIFICALLY SAYS WITH REGARD TO THOSE SO FAR AS YET UNIDENTIFIED MANDATORY VACCINATIONS EXEMPTIONS ARE ALLOWED FOR BOTH MEDICAL REASONS AND PERSONAL BELIEFS.

SO NOT ONLY IS IT NARROWLY TAILORED TO THE 10, IT ALSO PRESERVES THE PERSONAL BELIEF EXEMPTION TO VACCINATIONS THAT ARE NOT AS YET ACKNOWLEDGED OR RECOGNIZED, AT LEAST BY THE LEGISLATURE, TO REQUIRE MANDATORY VACCINATIONS IRRESPECTIVE OF THE PARENTS' PERSONAL BELIEFS.

THE STATUTE IS ALSO NARROWLY TAILORED FOR A NUMBER OF OTHER REASONS. PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL ACKNOWLEDGE THERE IS A MEDICAL EXEMPTION. AND THAT, BY THE WAY, IS ENTIRELY CONSISTENT WITH JACOBSON WHICH, IF MEMORY SERVES ME RIGHT, THE LANGUAGE THAT THE PLAINTIFFS WERE RELYING UPON WITH REGARD TO JACOBSON SETTING MAXIMUM LIMITS IN PRINCIPLE, THE COURT ACTUALLY WAS REFERRING TO INSTANCES WHERE A VACCINATION MAY DO PHYSICAL HARM TO THE RECIPIENT. AND IN THAT CASE THE COURT WAS RESERVING ITS DECISION FOR SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES.

SO THE MEDICAL EXEMPTION IS NOT CONTRARY TO JACOBSON; IN FACT IT IS COMPLETELY CONSISTENT WITH IT.

THE COURT: ON THE FEDERAL CLAIMS, WHAT ABOUT THE HYBRID RIGHTS THEORY?

MR. RICH: AGAIN, I AM AFRAID I DO NOT AGREE WITH

THE PLAINTIFFS ON THAT CASE. THE CASE THAT THEY WERE

REFERRING TO, OREGON -- AS THEY CHARACTERIZE IT OREGON V.

SMITH, AS I UNDERSTAND IT IS CITED AS EMPLOYMENT DIVISION 1 2 VERSUS SMITH. 3 AND YOU ASKED FOR THE -- THE COURT ASKED FOR A CITATION, AND IT IS AT 494 U.S. 872, 1990. IF YOUR HONOR 4 NEEDS I COULD CITE THE PARALLEL CITES, IF YOU NEED THEM. 5 6 THE COURT: THAT'S ALL RIGHT. 7 MR. RICH: ALL RIGHT. THE HYBRID RIGHTS SO-CALLED DOCTRINE IS REALLY NOT A 8 DOCTRINE THAT HAS BEEN UNIFORMLY ACCEPTED BY THE CIRCUIT. 9 10 THE COURT: ISN'T IT ACCEPTED IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT, 11 THOUGH? 12 MR. RICH: NO, IT IS NOT, YOUR HONOR. I DISAGREE 13 WITH THAT, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT. 14 THE PLAINTIFFS CITED TO THE THOMAS CASE, WHICH HAD APPARENTLY -- THE PANEL IN THOMAS HAD APPLIED THE HYBRID 15 16 RIGHTS -- THE HYBRID RIGHTS DOCTRINE. 17 THE COURT: IS THAT THE PICKUP CASE, PICKUP V. THOMAS, PERHAPS? 18 19 MR. RICH: IT IS THOMAS VERSUS ANCHORAGE EQUAL 20 RIGHTS COMMISSION, I BELIEVE. 21 THE COURT: ISN'T THERE ANOTHER CASE, PICKUP. IT IS AN ALASKA CASE WITH JUDGE O'SCANNLAIN? 22 23 MR. RICH: RIGHT. THAT IS THE ONE THAT I AM 24 REFERRING TO, YOUR HONOR. BUT WHEN I SHEPARDIZED THE CASE 25 THAT WAS CITED IN PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF, THAT THOMAS CASE, THE

DECISION WAS WITHDRAWN. IT IS NO LONGER PUBLISHED. IN FACT I COULDN'T EVEN READ THE CASE, AT LEAST UNDER LEXIS, IT WOULDN'T ALLOW ME TO.

THAT MAY BE INCORRECT ON MY PART. I CERTAINLY INVITE THE COURT TO DOUBLE CHECK ME ON THAT.

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BUT SINCE THAT CASE, AS YOUR HONOR HAS POINTED OUT,
THE OTHER THOMAS CASE IN 2000, IN HIS CONCURRING OPINION,
JUSTICE O'SCANNLAIN OBSERVED THAT IT HAS BEEN DEEMED A LIVE
CONTROVERSY ARISING IN ONE OF THE STATES OF THIS CIRCUIT,
SMITH IS FRAUGHT WITH COMPLEXITY BOTH IN DOCTRINE AND IN
PRACTICE. IN FACT OBSERVED THAT THE MAJORITY AVOIDED THE
ISSUE, AND HE THOUGHT PRUDENTLY SO, UNTIL THE SUPREME COURT
CLARIFIED WHAT IT MEANT BY THE LANGUAGE IN SMITH.

SINCE THAT THOMAS CASE THERE ARE TWO OTHER CASES IN

THE NINTH CIRCUIT -- PARDON ME -- THREE OTHER CASES -- PARDON

ME -- I WAS RIGHT THE FIRST TIME, TWO OTHER CASES IN THE NINTH

CIRCUIT.

IN 2008 IN THE JACOBS CASE, 526 F.3RD 419, THE COURT SPECIFICALLY DECLINED TO APPLY THE HYBRID RIGHTS TEST. IN FOOTNOTE 45 THE COURT STATES: WE REJECT PLAINTIFFS' CONTENTION THAT JACOBS AND DRESSER RAISED HYBRID RIGHTS CLAIMS THAT SHOULD BE SUBJECTED TO STRICT SCRUTINY. THE HYBRID RIGHTS DOCTRINE HAS BEEN WIDELY CRITICIZED. AND IN FACT CITES TO THE DISSENTING OPINION OF JUSTICE SOUTER IN CITY OF HIALEAH, EXPLAINING WHY THE DOCTRINE IS ULTIMATELY UNTENABLE.

AND THEN THERE IS A STRING CITE TO SEVERAL OTHER CASES CALLING 1 THE DOCTRINE COMPLETELY ILLOGICAL. DECLINING TO -- THE SIXTH 3 CIRCUIT DECLINED TO RECOGNIZE IT UNTIL THE SUPREME COURT EXPRESSLY DOES SO ITSELF. 4 5 THE COURT: YOUR VIEW OF THE BOTTOM LINE IS THE 6 NINTH CIRCUIT, PICKUP VERSUS -- I THINK WE ARE TALKING ABOUT 7 THE SAME CASE -- THOMAS, HAS BEEN WITHDRAWN. 8 MR. RICH: THAT IS MY UNDERSTANDING, YOUR HONOR. 9 CORRECT. 10 THE COURT: SO --11 MR. RICH: THERE IS ONE MORE CITE, YOUR HONOR, I 12 WON'T BELABOR YOU WITH, BUT I WILL JUST GIVE YOU THE CITATION. THE STEVENS CASE, WHICH IS, I BELIEVE, OUT OF THIS DISTRICT, 13 810 F.SUPP. 2D 1074. 14 15 NOW, IN THERE THE COURT ASSUMED WITHOUT DECIDING 16 THAT THE COMPELLING INTEREST ANALYSIS APPLIED TO THE HYBRID 17 RIGHTS CLAIM, BUT SKIRTED THE ISSUE WITHOUT ADOPTING IT, ACKNOWLEDGING THE INSTABILITY OF THE ALLEGED DOCTRINE AND 18 19 SIMPLY HELD THAT IT MET THE TEST, IN ANY EVENT. 20 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. SO YOU WOULD STAND ON THE 21 ARGUMENTS YOU RAISED IN THE BRIEFING, THAT THE RATIONAL BASIS 22 TEST WOULD APPLY TO THE FEDERAL CLAIMS. 23 MR. RICH: THAT IS CORRECT, YOUR HONOR.

THE COURT: WHAT ABOUT --

MR. RICH: I AM SORRY.

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THAT BEING SAID, NEVERTHELESS, SHOULD STRICT

SCRUTINY APPLY WE BELIEVE WITHOUT HESITATION THAT SB 277

FULFILLS STRICT SCRUTINY. AND WE -- FOR THE REASONS STATED IN

OUR BRIEF.

THE COURT: DO YOU -- AND PERHAPS YOU ARGUED IT

EXPLICITLY, THIS CONCEPT THAT I HAD ASKED PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL

ABOUT. IS IT THE STATE'S POSITION THAT CALIFORNIA CAN REQUIRE

VACCINATION OF SCHOOL CHILDREN EVEN WITHOUT PROVIDING A FREE

EXERCISE EXEMPTION?

MR. RICH: ABSOLUTELY, YOUR HONOR. FOR ALL OF THE REASONS STATED BY YOU IN YOUR QUESTIONING, THOSE VERY CASES WE HAD INTENDED TO BRING TO YOUR ATTENTION IN THIS ARGUMENT.

IF I MAY ALSO, WITH REGARD TO THE RIGHT TO

EDUCATION, THERE IS ACTUALLY -- THERE ARE TWO CASES THAT

ACTUALLY ADDRESS MANDATORY VACCINATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT -- A STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO AN

EDUCATION, AND ONE OF THEM IS IN FACT BY THE CALIFORNIA

SUPREME COURT. IT IS THE FRENCH CASE THAT WE CITED IN OUR

BRIEF.

THE COURT: IS THAT --

MR. RICH: FRENCH VERSUS DAVIDSON.

AND ON PAGE 662 -- AND IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE CASE WAS DECIDED IN 1994, AFTER THE ENACTMENT OF THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION PROVIDING FOR A RIGHT TO PUBLIC EDUCATION, WHICH I BELIEVE WAS ADOPTED IN 1879.

AND IN THAT CASE, WITHOUT MUCH FURTHER DISCUSSION, I WILL AGREE, BUT THE COURT STATES ON PAGE 662 -- AND THIS IS AT THE 143 CAL. 658 CITATION. REFERRING TO THE STATUTE IT SAYS IT IN NO WAY INTERFERES WITH THE RIGHT OF THE CHILD TO ATTEND SCHOOL PROVIDED THE CHILD COMPLIES WITH THE PROVISIONS.

2.0

NOW, THERE IS ANOTHER CASE THAT WAS IN FACT CITED BY JACOBSON AND DISCUSSED AT LENGTH IN JACOBSON, WHICH COMES OUT OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEAL, VIEMEISTER VERSUS WHITE. AND THE CITATION FOR THAT IS RATHER ANCIENT. IT IS 70 L.R.A. 796. IT IS REPORTED IN THE NEW YORK REPORTS AT 179 NEW YORK 235.

AND THERE THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED A CHALLENGE TO NEW YORK'S MANDATORY VACCINATION STATUTE AS A VIOLATION OF NEW YORK'S CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ENSURING THE RIGHT TO AN EDUCATION, WHICH IS SUBSTANTIALLY ——
IS VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL TO CALIFORNIA'S.

AND IN THAT CASE THE COURT SPECIFICALLY HELD THAT
THE RIGHT TO ATTEND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF THE STATE IS
NECESSARILY SUBJECT TO SOME RESTRICTIONS AND LIMITATIONS IN
THE INTEREST OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH. THEN HELD THAT IN FACT
THAT MANDATORY VACCINATION STATUTE IN NEW YORK SURVIVED
NOTWITHSTANDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO AN EDUCATION.

THERE IS A THIRD CASE OUT OF CALIFORNIA WHICH I
THINK GOES TO YOUR HONOR'S QUESTION AS TO THE NECESSITY OF A
PERSONAL BELIEF OR A RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION. THAT CASE IS THE
WILLIAMS CASE CITED IN OUR BRIEF. THAT CASE -- THE CITE TO

THAT IS 23 CAL.APP. 619, THE COURT OF APPEAL OUT OF THE FIRST DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA.

2.0

IN THAT CASE AT ISSUE WAS A CHALLENGE TO A PROVISION BY THE CALIFORNIA BOARD OF REGENTS GOVERNING THE UNIVERSITY ADMISSION, WHICH DID NOT CONTAIN ANY PERSONAL BELIEF EXEMPTION, REQUIRED VACCINATIONS.

APPARENTLY, CONTRARY TO WHAT COUNSEL HAS -UNDERSTANDS, THERE WAS A PERSONAL BELIEF EXEMPTION IN
CALIFORNIA FOR THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS AT LEAST GOING BACK TO 1913.

AND THE PLAINTIFF IN FRENCH ARGUED BECAUSE THERE IS
A PERSONAL BELIEF EXEMPTION IN THE STATE STATUTE THAT APPLIES
TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS, THE REGENTS HAD NO DISCRETION AND HAD TO IN
FACT ACT CONSISTENTLY IN ITS REGULATIONS AND PROVIDE ONE FOR
UNIVERSITY STUDENTS. AND THE COURT SAID NO, IT DOES NOT,
BECAUSE IT IS NOT A NECESSARY ELEMENT OF THE STATUTE.

IN FACT THE COURT SAYS -- AND I AM QUOTING -- IT
WOULD RATHER SEEM TO BE THE VERY OPPOSITE OF A HEALTH
REGULATION FOR A LAW, WHOSE TITLE DECLARES ITS PURPOSE TO
ENCOURAGE AND PROVIDE FOR A GENERAL VACCINATION, TO HAVE
EMBRACED WITHIN IT A PROVISO EXEMPTING FROM SUCH VACCINATION
THOSE WHOSE MENTAL ATTITUDE IS THAT OF OPPOSITION TO THE
AVOWED OBJECT OF THE LAW.

AND IT SAID THAT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA WAS NOT BOUND BY THE OPERATION OR EFFECT OF THAT, IT WAS A DISCRETIONARY PROVISION WITHIN THE STATE STATUTE AND DID NOT

QUALIFY AS A HEALTH REGULATION OR IN ANY OTHER WAY WAS ENFORCEABLE AGAINST THE REGENTS.

THE COURT: IT IS THE STATE'S ARGUMENT, THEN, THAT THE PBE IS NOT REQUIRED IN THE FIRST INSTANCE.

MR. RICH: CORRECT.

THE COURT: SO IF IT IS NOT REQUIRED IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, THERE IS NOTHING TO PRECLUDE THE STATE FROM TAKING IT AWAY.

MR. RICH: CORRECT. IT IS A CREATURE OF STATUTE,
YOUR HONOR, AND AS SUCH IT CAN BE REMOVED BY THE LEGISLATURE
IN ITS JUDGMENT.

THE COURT: AND THE STATE ARGUES IT IS A CREATURE OF STATUTE NOT NECESSITATED BY ANY CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION.

MR. RICH: WE BELIEVE THAT IS VERY CLEAR, NOT ONLY BASED UPON JACOBSON BUT THE ABEEL CASE FROM THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT, WHICH PREDATES JACOBSON, WHICH UPHELD CALIFORNIA'S MANDATORY VACCINATION STATUTE.

AND, BY THE WAY, THE ABEEL CASE POSTDATES -- I
BELIEVE IT WAS DECIDED IN 1890, WHICH WAS 11 YEARS AFTER THE
CALIFORNIA RIGHT TO EDUCATION PROVISION WAS ADOPTED.

NOW, ABEEL DID NOT EXPRESSLY ADDRESS THE ISSUE IN
THE CONTEXT OF THAT PARTICULAR PROVISION, BUT ABEEL, WHICH IS
CITED BY JACOBSON, SPECIFICALLY HELD THAT IT WAS FOR THE
LEGISLATURE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE SCHOLARS OF THE PUBLIC
SCHOOLS SHOULD BE SUBJECTED TO IT. AND WE THINK IT WAS

JUSTIFIED IN DEEMING IT A NECESSARY AND SALUTARY BURDEN TO 1 2 IMPOSE UPON THAT GENERAL CLASS, MEANING OF STUDENTS. 3 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. MR. RICH: SO OUR BELIEF, YOUR HONOR, IS BASED NOT 4 5 ONLY ON FEDERAL DOCTRINES, AS APPLIED TO THE STATES 6 REPEATEDLY, BUT ALSO CALIFORNIA LAW. 7 THERE HAS NOT BEEN A SINGLE CASE THAT WE ARE AWARE 8 OF THAT, IN THE HISTORY OF OUR JURISPRUDENCE, HAS RULED IN THE 9 MANNER IN WHICH THE PLAINTIFFS ARE ASKING THIS COURT TO RULE. 10 AND BECAUSE OF THIS WE BELIEVE IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THEY ARE 11 GOING TO PREVAIL ON THEIR CLAIMS. 12 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU. 13 MR. RICH: MAY I ADDRESS THE COURT'S QUESTIONS WITH 14 REGARD TO DELAY AS WELL, OR ARE YOU SATISFIED ON THAT ISSUE? THE COURT: I THINK I HAVE SUFFICIENT INFORMATION. 15 16 MR. RICH: OKAY. THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 17 THE COURT: MR. TURNER, WOULD YOU LIKE TO RESPOND, OR ANY PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL? 18 19 MS. ROSENBERG: YES, I WOULD. THANK YOU, YOUR 20 HONOR. 21 THE COURT: THEN FOLLOWING THESE RESPONSES WE WILL 22 RECESS. 23 MS. ROSENBERG: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 24 I WOULD LIKE TO RESPOND TO A NUMBER OF POINTS THAT 25 MR. RICH MADE.

FIRST, HE STATES THAT SB 277 DOES NOT TARGET A
CHILD'S RIGHT TO AN EDUCATION. WE BELIEVE WHILE IT OBVIOUSLY
ON ITS FACE DOESN'T DIRECTLY SAY THAT IT IS TARGETING A RIGHT
TO A CHILD'S EDUCATION, THE EFFECT OF SB 277 ABSOLUTELY
TARGETS THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN WHOSE FAMILIES WOULD LIKE TO
EXERCISE PBE'S TO OBTAIN A CLASSROOM-BASED EDUCATION. AND IT
INFRINGES ON THAT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT.

2.0

THEY TALK ABOUT A SAFE AND HEALTHY SCHOOL

ENVIRONMENT. I BELIEVE WE HAVE ADDRESSED IN OUR PAPERS THAT

IN FACT THE 10 -- EVEN ASSUMING THE 10 MANDATED VACCINES, THAT

DOES NOT GUARANTEE A COMPLETELY SAFE SCHOOL ENVIRONMENT, IN

FACT CHILDREN ARE EXPOSED TO A NUMBER OF DISEASES FOR WHICH

VACCINES AREN'T -- AREN'T MANDATED.

THE FACT THAT SB 277 STILL WILL PERMIT -- ARGUABLY PERMIT PBE'S FOR NEWLY MANDATED VACCINES, WE BELIEVE RATHER THAN SUPPORTING DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENT ACTUALLY GOES AGAINST IT BECAUSE IT CREATES AN ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS DISTINCTION.

AGAIN, WE ARE CREATING A DISTINCTION ABOUT PBE'S FOR EXISTING MANDATES AND PBE'S FOR NEW MANDATES. AND THERE IS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR THAT DISTINCTION.

WITH RESPECT TO THE THOMAS CASE THAT COUNSEL CITED,
MY READING OF THOMAS AND MY SHEPARDIZING OF THOMAS SHOWS THAT
THOMAS STILL REMAINS GOOD LAW. THE LAW WE WERE CITING IS
THOMAS AGAINST ANCHORAGE EQUAL RIGHTS COMMISSION, 165 F.3RD
692. IT WAS REVERSED ON OTHER GROUNDS BUT ITS POSITON ON

HYBRID RIGHTS STILL STANDS AS LAW IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT AND IS GOOD LAW IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT, AS DOES THE OREGON V. SMITH CASE.

WITH RESPECT TO FRENCH, ABEEL, AND WILLIAMS, WE
BELIEVE THOSE CASES ARE DISTINGUISHABLE. FIRST, NONE OF THEM
ADDRESSES THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO EDUCATION UNDER THE
CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION. WHETHER OR NOT THOSE CASES WERE
DECIDED BEFORE OR AFTER THAT RIGHT WAS ENACTED UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION, THEY FAILED TO ADDRESS IT.

AND WITH RESPECT TO WILLIAMS, THERE IS NO
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO A COLLEGE EDUCATION UNDER CALIFORNIA LAW,
WE ARE TALKING ABOUT A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO A PRIMARY AND
SECONDARY SCHOOL EDUCATION.

WITHOUT PBE'S THE MANDATES WOULD VIOLATE THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION, AND IT DOES MANDATE STRICT SCRUTINY.

THEY ARE ALSO MANDATING DISEASES THAT ARE NOT COMMUNICABLE DISEASES. FOR EXAMPLE, THERE ARE MANDATES FOR VACCINES FOR TETANUS, WHICH IS A COMPLETELY NONCOMMUNICABLE DISEASE. FOR HEPATITIS B, WHICH IS A BLOOD-BORNE ILLNESS THAT IS NOT EASILY TRANSMITTED AMONG SCHOOL CHILDREN.

THE COURT: THERE IS LANGUAGE IN THE CASES, I THINK PRINCE AND OTHERS, THAT SEEM TO HAVE TWO INTERESTS; ONE IS PREVENTING CONTAGIOUS DISEASES AND THE OTHER IS THE STATE'S INTEREST IN THE INDIVIDUAL CHILD AND THE SAFETY OF THAT CHILD. COULDN'T IT BE ARGUED THAT THE STATE HAS AN INTEREST IN

MANDATING TETANUS SHOTS, EVEN THOUGH THAT IS NOT CONTAGIOUS IT IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD.

2.0

MS. ROSENBERG: THE STATE HERE HAS MADE THE ARGUMENT THAT THE REASON THESE MANDATES ARE NECESSARY AND THAT THE REMOVAL OF PBE'S IS NECESSARY IS BECAUSE THESE ARE CONTAGIOUS DISEASES THAT CHILDREN WILL EXPOSE ONE ANOTHER TO IN SCHOOL. THAT IS EXPLICITLY ARGUED IN THEIR PAPERS.

WITH RESPECT TO FRENCH, WILLIAMS, ABEEL, AGAIN THESE CASES WERE ALL DECIDED IN A VERY DIFFERENT ENVIRONMENT. THEY ALL RELATE TO A SMALLPOX VACCINATION. SMALLPOX, OBVIOUSLY, PARTICULARLY AT THE TURN OF THE LAST CENTURY, WAS A VERY DEADLY, HIGHLY COMMUNICABLE DISEASE. IT IS A VERY DIFFERENT ENVIRONMENT THAT WE ARE IN NOW.

IN ADDITION WE ADDRESS IN OUR PAPERS, BOTH IN OUR MOVING PAPERS AND OUR REPLY PAPERS, CONCERNS ABOUT VACCINE WANING IMMUNITY AND VACCINE FAILURE, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO THE PERTUSSIS AND MUMPS VACCINE. SO THERE IS A QUESTION CONCERNING PUBLIC HEALTH BENEFITS REGARDING THOSE VACCINES.

AND THE STATE HERE WE BELIEVE IS -- THE STATE HAS A NONDELEGABLE DUTY TO EDUCATE ALL CHILDREN, AND WE BELIEVE SB 277 ACTUALLY TRIES TO UNDERMINE AND MOVE THAT DUTY FROM THE STATE IMPERMISSIBLY TO PARENTS WHO ARE NOT CHOOSING THE HOME SCHOOLING OPTION FOR THEIR CHILDREN.

AGAIN, FOR PARENTS WHO CHOOSE TO HOME SCHOOL THAT IS AN EXCELLENT OPTION FOR THE PARENTS WHO MAKE THAT CHOICE. BUT

WHAT SB 277 IS DOING IS FORCING PARENTS WHO ARE NOW UNABLE TO OBTAIN PERSONAL BELIEF EXEMPTIONS TO HOME SCHOOL THEIR CHILDREN.

THE COURT: WHAT ABOUT THE COUNTER ARGUMENT THAT THE STATE MAKES THAT SB 277 ACTUALLY PROMOTES THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION FOR THE MASSES. SO THE 90 TO 95 PERCENT OR SO THAT ELECT TO BE VACCINATED, THEY ARGUE THOSE CHILDREN AND THEIR PARENTS HAVE A RIGHT TO EDUCATION IN A SAFE ENVIRONMENT, AND THAT THE INTERESTS OF THE FEWER CITIZENS AND CHILDREN HAS TO GIVE WAY.

MS. ROSENBERG: SURE. OF COURSE, YOUR HONOR. THERE ARE A COUPLE OF RESPONSES I HAVE TO THAT.

FIRST, AS I INDICATED, WE ARE TALKING ABOUT MANDATES FOR 10 DISEASES, AND CHILDREN ARE EXPOSED TO A NUMBER OF OTHER COMMUNICABLE DISEASES, YOU KNOW, MONONUCLEOSIS, STREP THROAT, THE COMMON COLD, IN SCHOOLS EVERY DAY. THESE AREN'T DISEASES FOR WHICH VACCINES ARE EVEN AVAILABLE, LET ALONE MANDATED. SO MANDATING VACCINATION FOR 10 DISEASES DOES NOT REMOVE ALL ILLNESS FROM SCHOOLS.

BUT MOST IMPORTANTLY IS THE FACT THAT THESE CHILDREN

ARE NOT SICK CHILDREN. THEY ARE HEALTHY CHILDREN. THEY ARE

NOT CURRENTLY CARRIERS OF DISEASE.

THE STATUS QUO AB 2109 HAD IN PLACE A PROVISION THAT

IF THERE WAS AN OUTBREAK OF A COMMUNICABLE DISEASE OR A

VACCINE -- A DISEASE FOR WHICH ONE OF THE VACCINES WAS

MANDATED, THAT CHILDREN WHO CANNOT PROVE EITHER IMMUNITY TO THE DISEASE --

AND IN FACT WE HAVE, YOUR HONOR, BY THE WAY, SOME PLAINTIFFS WHOSE CHILDREN ARE BEING EXCLUDED FROM SCHOOL EVEN THOUGH THEY HAVE HAD BLOOD TESTS CALLED TITER TESTS THAT SHOW THAT THEY ARE IMMUNE TO THE DISEASES FOR WHICH VACCINATION IS REQUIRED, BUT THEY ARE NOT ALLOWED TO GO TO SCHOOL EVEN THOUGH THEY HAVE PROOF OF IMMUNITY BECAUSE THEY HAVEN'T RECEIVED THAT PARTICULAR VACCINE.

BUT THESE CHILDREN ARE NOT -- THEY ARE NOT SICK
CHILDREN. AND THERE ARE PROVISIONS IN PLACE TO DEAL WITH
OUTBREAKS AND LIMITED EXCLUSION FOR BRIEF PERIODS OF TIME IN
ORDER TO CONTAIN THE SPREAD OF DISEASE. SO WE BELIEVE THAT
THE PRIOR LAW ACTUALLY ADEQUATELY ADDRESSES THOSE ISSUES.

FURTHER, WHAT THE STATE HAS BASICALLY DONE IS

ASSUMED THAT THESE CHILDREN -- BASED ON A FEAR OF CONTAGION

ASSUMED THAT THESE CHILDREN ARE DISEASED CHILDREN AND THEY ARE

TREATING THEM AS IF THEY ARE DISEASED CHILDREN; YET UNDER BOTH

FEDERAL AND CALIFORNIA LAW A CHILD WHO ACTUALLY HAS, FOR

EXAMPLE, HIV OR AIDS OR HAS HEPATITIS B IS ALLOWED TO, AND

SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO, ATTEND SCHOOL. WE ARE TREATING THESE

HEALTHY CHILDREN WORSE THAN WE ARE TREATING OTHER CHILDREN.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT.

MR. RICH.

MR. RICH: YOUR HONOR, MAY I ASK THE COURT'S

1 INDULGENCE --2 THE COURT: YES. 3 MR. RICH: -- JUST TO ADDRESS SOME VERY SPECIFIC LIMITED ISSUES THAT WERE RAISED IN COUNSEL'S REMARKS. 4 THE COURT: YES. 5 6 MR. RICH: FIRST OF ALL, MY COLLEAGUE, MS. YOUNG, 7 THROUGH THE WONDERS OF 21ST CENTURY SCIENCE, RESHEPARDIZED THE 8 CITE OF THOMAS VERSUS ANCHORAGE EQUAL RIGHTS COMMISSION AT 165 9 F.3RD 692. 10 AND IS THIS WESTLAW OR LEXIS? 11 MS. YOUNG: IT IS ON WESTLAW. 12 MR. RICH: WESTLAW, WHICH IS CONSISTENT WITH WHAT I 13 READ IN LEXIS, IT STATES "OPINION WITHDRAWN" BY THOMAS V. 14 ANCHORAGE, NINTH CIRCUIT, OCTOBER 19TH, 1999; WHICH IS THE CASE THAT YOU AND I WERE DISCUSSING WITH JUSTICE O'SCANNLAIN'S 15 16 CONCURRING OPINION. 17 THE COURT: YES. OKAY. MR. RICH: SO THE HYBRID RIGHTS EXCEPTION HAS NOT 18 19 BEEN ADOPTED BY THE NINTH CIRCUIT. 20 WITH REGARD TO TETANUS, YOUR HONOR, IF I COULD JUST 21 DRAW THE COURT'S ATTENTION TO THE LEGISLATIVE RECORD, BECAUSE 22 THIS IS AN ISSUE THAT WAS EXPRESSLY CONSIDERED BY THE 23 LEGISLATURE IN ENACTING SB 277. AND I AM REFERRING TO THE ECF

THE COURT: ON THAT ISSUE, I WOULD RESPECTFULLY

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NUMBERS.

DECLINE TO HEAR ARGUMENT. THERE HAS BEEN AN OBJECTION TO THE RECORD, AND I WOULD LIKE TO EVALUATE THIS CASE BASED ON WHAT IS STATED IN THE STATUTE ITSELF, AND THEN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUTORY ARGUMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN ADVANCED.

MR. RICH: VERY WELL, YOUR HONOR.

2.0

WITH REGARD TO THE LAST ARGUMENT THAT COUNSEL MADE
WITH REGARD TO THE FACT THAT SOME CHILDREN HAVE HAD LABORATORY
TESTS THAT INDICATE THEY ARE IMMUNE. THE CALIFORNIA
REGULATIONS, 17 CFR SECTION -- I BELIEVE IT IS -- FORGIVE ME.
I WON'T BELABOR THE COURT.

BUT CALIFORNIA REGULATIONS EXPRESSLY PROVIDE THAT A CHILD WHO HAS BEEN NATURALLY IMMUNIZED BY HAVING CONTRACTED THE DISEASE WOULD QUALIFY FOR A MEDICAL EXEMPTION SO LONG AS, DEPENDING UPON THE VACCINATION, EITHER A PHYSICIAN CERTIFIES THAT, CONFIRMS THAT IN WRITING, AND WITH SOME OF THE VACCINE, I BELIEVE RUBELLA AND MEASLES, THAT THE PHYSICIAN HAS TO CONFIRM IT WITH AN ACCEPTED LABORATORY CERTIFICATION.

SO THE STATE ALREADY ACKNOWLEDGES THAT CIRCUMSTANCE.

I DON'T KNOW THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH PLAINTIFFS HAVE

ALLEGED. I DON'T KNOW THE LABORATORIES, THEY HAVEN'T ALLEGED

THESE WITH ANY PARTICULARITY.

FINALLY, YOUR HONOR, WITH REGARD TO THIS NOTION OF PARTIAL VACCINATION. I JUST WANT TO LEAVE THE COURT WITH THIS THOUGHT, THAT I BELIEVE THAT THE ARGUMENT IS UNFOUNDED.

IF PARENTS ARE ASKING FOR THE RIGHT TO MAKE

DECISIONS VIS-A-VIS ANY ONE PARTICULAR VACCINATION, THEN THEY

ARE INDEED ASKING FOR THE RIGHT TO REJECT ALL VACCINATIONS,

BECAUSE OTHERWISE ANY RULING OF THIS COURT IS UNWORKABLE.

IF THE PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO REJECT TWO OR

THREE OF THE VACCINATIONS, WHAT WOULD STOP OTHER PARENTS FROM

REJECTING EIGHT OR NINE OF THE VACCINATIONS, OR ALL 10.

THAT IS THE THOUGHT I WOULD LEAVE THE COURT WITH.

THE COURT: OKAY. I WANT TO THANK COUNSEL FOR APPEARING. IT WAS NICE TO SEE YOU ALL IN PERSON, TO MEET YOU HERE IN COURT. AND I APPRECIATE, AS INDICATED, ALL OF THE BRIEFING AND SUBMISSIONS.

AND I APPRECIATE ALL OF YOU IN THE GALLERY WHO HAVE TAKEN TIME OUT OF YOUR BUSY SCHEDULES TO BE HERE TO PARTICIPATE AND TO WITNESS AND EVALUATE THE ARGUMENTS.

I UNDERSTAND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ISSUE AND HOW DEEPLY HELD THESE PERSONAL BELIEFS ARE. AND I WILL TAKE THAT THOUGHT INTO CONSIDERATION WHEN I ISSUE A RULING.

THE DECISION I MAKE WILL BE IN WRITTEN FORM. I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE IT UNDER SUBMISSION. AND I WILL DO MY BEST TO DO SO PROMPTLY, GIVEN THE SCHOOL YEAR THAT IS IMPENDING ON A NUMBER OF CHILDREN.

I THINK, REALISTICALLY, IT MAY NOT BE NEXT WEEK BUT
PERHAPS THE FOLLOWING WEEK THAT I ISSUE AN ORDER. I WILL DO
MY BEST TO GET IT OUT SOON, BUT I AM WORKING IN A TIME FRAME
SUCH THAT I HAVE ALL OF THE COMPETING ISSUES IN MIND AND I

1	WILL ISSUE A RULING AS SOON AS I PRACTICALLY CAN.
2	THANK YOU VERY MUCH, AND HAVE A NICE WEEKEND.
3	MR. RICH: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.
4	MR. TURNER: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.
5	MS. ROSENBERG: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.
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7	* * *
8	I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT
9	TRANSCRIPT FROM THE RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.
10	S/LEEANN PENCE 8/16/2016
11	LEEANN PENCE, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER DATE
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